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M

ost of the contributions to this "Blue Book" focus on the possibility of
computer network attacks by States as a methodology for so-called information warfare and the kinds ofresponses that may be taken consistendy with
the constraints of international law. 1 In this chapter, however, the focus shifts
from the use offorce by States to criminal acts committed by private individuals
not under the sponsorship or control ofa State. With this shift offocus, the applicable legal regime becomes international criminal law rather than provisions of
the UN Charter governing the use offorce and the maintenance ofinternational
peace and security.
To be sure, "international criminal law" is an area of considerable definitional
ambiguity. Some eminent commentators have denied its very existence.2 Other
commentators, the majority, have defined international crimes as certain acts
that constitute a crime against international law seeking only a tribunal withjurisdiction to apply that law and punish the criminal. Piracy is the prototypical example they cite. In response, the sceptics view piracy as solely a municipal law
crime, the only question of international law being the extent of a State's jurisdiction to apply its criminal law to an accused foreigner acting outside the territorial jurisdiction of the prescribing State.3

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Even for those crimes arguably constituting crimes under international as well
as municipal law, it is necessary-in the absence of an international criminal
court-to employ national law enforcement officials and national courts for
purposes of apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing offenders. Accordingly,
another dimension of "international criminal law" involves international cooperation in the enforcement of municipal criminal law . Although most efforts toward international cooperation in the enforcement of municipal criminal law
have been on a bilateral or regional basis, the United Nations has played an increasingly important role in this area.
Considerable definitional ambiguity also surrounds the terms "terrorism" and
"international terrorism." Despite strenuous efforts to do so, neither the United
Nations nor its specialized agencies have been able to agree on a definition of
"international terrorism."4 Rather, as we shall see later in this chapter, the
United Nations has adopted a piecemeal approach to the problem through the
adoption of separate conventions aimed at suppressing particular manifestations
of terrorism. Although these treaty provisions are often loosely described as
"antiterrorist," the acts that they cover are criminalized regardless of whether, in
a particular case, they could be described as "terrorism."
Even at the domestic level, as illustrated by the US experience, defining international terrorism is a tricky proposition. Under US law there are a variety of
definitions that serve a variety of purposes. 5 Most important, at least at the federallevel, there is no crime of "terrorism" per se. Rather, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 provides US criminal jurisdiction
over the killing of, or an act of physical violence with intent to cause serious
bodily injury to or that results in such injury to, a US national outside the United
States. 6 Although the relevant chapter of the Act is entided "Extra-territorialJurisdiction over Terrorist Acts Abroad against United States Nationals," there is
no requirement that the killing or violent act include the traditional elements ofa
terrorist act. Instead, the legislation incorporates the elements of terrorism as a
limitation on prosecutorial discretion:
(e) LIMITATION ON PROSECUTION. No prosecution for any offense
described in this Section shall be undertaken by the United States except on
written certification of the Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate
of the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in the
judgment of the certifying official, such offense was intended to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population.
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The conference report on the act makes it clear that the certification of the
Attorney General or his designate is final and not subject to judicial review. 7 The
report also clarifies the meaning of the term "civilian population" by noting that
it "includes a general population as well as other specific identifiable segments of
society such as the membership of a religious faith or of a particular
nationality.... "8 It is not necessary that either the targeted government or the
civilian population be that of the United States. 9
As a general working definition for this chapter, I shall employ the definitions
ofterrorism utilized by the US Government for statistical and analytical purposes
since 1983:
• The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant10 targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
• The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or
territory of more than one country.
• The term "terrorist group" means any group practIcmg, or that has
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 11
International terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and it is a topic that has
been subjected to substantial scholarly (and some not so scholarly) analysis.
Accordingly, in preparing this chapter, I have asked myself what I would call
the Monty Python question: does the prospect of computer network attacks
by terrorists constitute something "completely different,"12 or does it amount
only to a new technique of attack for terrorists raising no new issues of law
and policy? The answer, it appears, is that the possibility of computer network
attacks does raise some new issues, although many of the old conundrums still
pertain.
Efforts to combat international terrorism may take place at three different
stages. The first, and ideal, stage is before a terrorist attack has occurred. Here the
effort is to prevent a terrorist attack, either through the hardening ofpossible targets of terrorist attack or through intelligence work that allows law enforcement
officials to learn of a planned attack in advance and intercept it.
The second stage involves responding to a terrorist attack while it is in progress, bringing it to an end, minimizing the damage it causes, and preventing
panic among the general population. As we shall see, computer network attacks
may present special challenges at this stage.
The third and last stage is where the perpetrators of the terrorist acts have succeeded in their mission, and it is necessary to apprehend them, submit them to
prosecution before a tribunal with jurisdiction and fair procedures, and, if they are
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found guilty, punish them. Here, too, computer network attacks may present special challenges.
In the sections that follow, I address some ofthe possible problems ofcombatting
international terrorism at these three stages raised by the prospect of computer network attacks by terrorists. The final section sets forth some concluding observations.

Prevention
The Threat of Computer Network Attacks
Other chapters in this "Blue Book" discuss the nature of computer network
attacks at great length and with substantial authority. No attempt is made to duplicate these efforts. Rather, this contribution attempts to discuss the concept of
computer network attacks as a type of international criminal activity that might
be engaged in by terrorists.
To this end it may be useful to distinguish, as Michael Schmitt has done in another context,13 between computer network attacks and information operations . .As explaine.d by Schmitt, "information operations" should be defined
expansively to "encompass, among an array of other activities, virtually any
nonconsensual actions intended to discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer
data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a
computer network."14 Moreover, information operations are subdivided into
defensive and offensive information operations. Computer network attacks fall
within the latter category and consist of"(o)perations to disrupt, deny, degrade,
or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves."15
So defined, computer network attacks may take a variety of forms. They
could be limited to the copying of sensitive data, which, depending on the circumstances, might constitute espionage, or include techniques for altering or
destroying data and programs. Other computer network attacks might result in
physical destruction, such as, most ominously, the "meltdown" of a nuclear reactor as a consequence ofinterference with its control system. Still other possible
examples of computer network attacks have been suggested by Schmitt:
1. Trains are misrouted and crash after the computer systems controlling them are
maliciously manipulated.
2. An information blockade is mounted to limit the flow of electronic
information into or out of a target State.
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3. Banking computer systems are broken into and their databases corrupted.
4. An automated municipal traffic control system is compromised, thereby
causing massive traffic jams and frustrating responses by emergency fire, medical,
and law enforcement vehicles.
5. Intrusion into the computer system controlling water distribution allows the
intruder to rapidly open and close valves. This creates a hammer effect that
eventually causes widespread pipe ruptures.
6. A logic bomb set to activate upon initiation of mass casualty operations is
imbedded in a municipal emergency response computer system. 16

As he recognizes, some of these examples are realistic while others may
stretch credulity.
There is, moreover, the question of the technical capability of individual terrorists to engage in such computer network attacks without State support or
sponsorship. In the past, the United States and other potential State targets ofterrorist attack have benefitted from the relative technological incompetence of the
terrorists. 17 For many years now, however, computer systems have been recognized as being especially vulnerable to terrorist attack. 1S And, in the words ofone
e}..-pert, "(t)he growing sophistication of high school students now entering college will ensure an ever greater pool ofpersons capable [of engaging in computer
network attacks]."19
Another useful distinction to keep in mind is between those computer network attacks that (1) may cause disruption ofvital systems leading to widespread
inconvenience, possibly to some degree of public alarm, but that do not direcdy
threaten life, and (2) those that direcdy threaten or appear direcdy to threaten
human life. 20 Most computer network attacks are more likely to fill within the
first category than within the second. 21
A major difficulty facing all efforts to prevent or combat computer network
attacks is that they can be carried out remotely and often from great distances.
Since anyone can access the Internet from anywhere in the world, law enforcement officials may have no idea where the attacker is located. Under such
circumstances, law enforcement officials will not know the motive behind the
attack or the identity of the attackers. Even if they succeed in tracking the
source of the attack to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), this ISP may be a
mere conduit, or the attack may actually have originated with a subscriber to
that service.
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Hardening of Targets
Identification and hardening of critical targets of possible terrorist attack has
long been recognized as a crucial step in preventing terrorist attack. 22 Virtually
every major network-communications, electrical power, pipelines, and
data-is vulnerable to terrorist attack. The vulnerability of many of these networks, however, depends on the would be attacker being able to identify the
critical nodes. For example, taking out one refinery would have little effect on
the oil industry. But attacks on certain pipelines could have devastating effects.
Computer systems, on the other hand, are especially vulnerable, and "(i) it
would not be difficult to seriously disrupt the Social Security System, nor would
it be impossible to inflict vast harm to the Federal Reserve."23
This special vulnerability makes it especially difficult to harden computer networks against attack. Electronic vulnerabilities are often harder to guard than
"traditional" vulnerabilities against terrorist attack. Part of the problem is the
vastness and complexity of the information infrastructure. As of 1996, for example, the defense establishment reportedly had over 2.1 million computers,
10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks. 24 Moreover, although
it is clear that this infrastructure is subjected to a large number of attacks, the
number of reported incidents is probably just the tip of the iceberg because, according to estimates, only about one in 150 attacks is actually detected and reported.25 The same pattern is likely present in other sectors of the US
Government and in the vast private sector.
Security technologies and products-such as, for example, firewalls 26 and
smart cards27-may afford some protection, but they are hardly foolproo(28 Additionally, as new security tools are developed, computer network attackers
learn how to defeat them or exploit other vulnerabilities.
Human failings greatly compound the problem, as when ine)..-perienced or
untrained users accidentally publicize their passwords or weak passwords are
chosen which can be easily guessed. Accordingly, it is generally agreed that training in information security for personnel, including top management, is a crucial
element for a good information systems security program.29

Intelligence Operations
There is general agreement that the collection and use ofintelligence is an effective tool in combating terrorism. Ideally, the gathering ofintelligence serves a
preventive role and enables law enforcement officials to intercept terrorists at an
early stage, before they inflict injury on persons or property. However, even
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with respect to terrorists who employ more conventional methods than computers, this has proven to be a difficult task to accomplish.
Problems may arise at the national leveL In the United States, for example,
there is evidence that constraints imposed on intelligence activities from 1975 to
1980 may have adversely affected the timing and availability of preventive intelligence to the extent that the proportion of cases in which violence or other
crimes were prevented declined. 3o
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and clearly would apply to law enforcement searches of
computer data bases in the United States.
The risk to privacy concerns would be especially great under such circumstances. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of197831 regulates electronic
surveillance offoreign powers and the agents offoreign powers and defines "foreign power" to include "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor. "32 The act sets up a special court consisting ofseven districtjudges who hear and determine applications for electronic surveillance warrants. The statute allows warrantless electronic acquisition of communications
exclusively between foreign powers not involving a substantial likelihood that
the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party.33
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to searches and seizures abroad ofproperty owned by non-US citizens
or permanent residents. 34 However, search and seizure of material located in
computers abroad may be viewed by foreign sovereigns as a violation of their
territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the standard techniques for obtaining criminal evidence abroad-letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance treaties, for
example-are designed to assist in apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing
those who have already committed crimes, not as a device to gather intelligence
regarding the possible future commission of a crime.
Under these circumstances, then, cooperation between US and foreign intelligence officers would seem vital. Nonetheless, foreign laws protecting privacy are, if
anything, more stringent than those of the United States. Therefore, in either the
domestic or the international context, the challenge to balance privacy and individual rights concerns with the requirements of law enforcement is formidable. 35

Management of an On-going Terrorist Incident
The goals of counter-terrorism efforts during an ongoing terrorist incident
would at a minimum be threefold: (1) to bring the terrorist attack to an end;
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(2) to minimize the damage caused by the attack; and (3) to prevent panic and
restore order. A computer network attack by terrorists would probably complicate and make fulfilhnent of these goals more difficult.
This would especially be the case if the computer attack was widespread and
well coordinated and involved both governmental and private sector targets.
Suppose, for example, that simultaneous computer attacks disrupted the US
command and control infrastructure so that individual military units were unable to communicate with each other or with a central command; air traffic control systems were also disrupted, causing planes to crash with substantial loss of
life; a "computer worm" or "virus" traveled from computer to computer across
a network, damaging data and causing systems to crash. Assume further that the
sources of these attacks could not be easily located. The challenges facing authorities seeking to bring the attacks quickly to a halt and to prevent panic would
be monumental.
Panic might be particularly pronounced because many otherwise informed
people tend to dismiss the prospect of computer network attacks as a minor risk.
According to Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council:
[CEOs of big corporations] think I'm talking about a 14-year-old hacking into
their Web sites. I'm talking about people shutting down a city's electricity,
shutting down 911 systems, shutting down telephone networks and
transportation systems. You black out a city, people die. Black out lots of cities,
lots of people die. It's as bad as being attacked by bombs .... Imagine a few years
from now a President goes forth and orders troops to move. The lights go out, the
phones don't ring, the trains don't move. That's what we mean by an electronic
Pearl Harbor. 36

Apprehension, Prosecution, and Punishment
Apprehension
Before a suspect can be apprehended, he or she must be located. As has often
been noted elsewhere in this "Blue Book," computer network attackers can
frustrate investigatory efforts by "looping and weaving" their attacks through
several foreign countries, thus gready complicating the efforts ofinvestigators to
follow their trail. If the suspect is located, it then becomes necessary to induce
law enforcement officials of the place where he is located to take him into custody. They will not do so unless the computer network attack in question would

330

John F. Murphy
be a crime under their local law.37 This requirement would also have to be met as
a condition of extradition because of the "double criminality" requirement in
virtually all extradition treaties. 38

Prosecution and Punishment
If the suspect is apprehended abroad, the issue arises whether, and ifso where,
he will be prosecuted. At present, no multilateral antiterrorism convention expressly covers computer attacks. 39 However, depending on the circumstances, it
is possible that one of the existing conventions-e.g., the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation4o or even the not
yet in force International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing41-could apply. If so, the extradite or prosecute approach that is the
keystone of these conventions would govern the rights and obligations of the
States parties.
Under this approach a State party that apprehends an alleged offender in its
territory must either extradite him or submit his case to its own authorities for
purposes ofprosecution.42 Stricdy speaking, none of the antiterrorism conventions alone creates an obligation to extradite; by requiring the submission of alleged offenders for prosecution if extra,dition fails, they contain an inducement to
extradite. Moreover, a legal basis for extradition is provided either in the convention or through incorporation of the offenses mentioned in the convention
into existing or future e}."tradition treaties between the parties. To varying degrees, the conventions also obligate the parties to take the important practical
step of attempting to apprehend the accused and hold him in custody.43
The most important goal of these provisions is to ensure prosecution of the
accused. To this end, the conventions state quite strongly the alternative obligation either to e}."tradite or to submit the accused for prosecution. The obligation,
however, is not to try the accused, much less to punish him, but to submit the
case to be considered for prosecution by the appropriate national prosecuting
authority. If the prosecuting State's criminal justice system lacks integrity, the
risk of political intervention in the prosecution or at trial exists. Such intervention may prevent the trial or conviction of the accused, or act as a mitigating influence at the sentencing stage.
Even if the prosecuting State's criminal justice system functions with integrity, it may be very difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to convict the accused when the alleged offense was committed in another country. This very
practical impediment to conviction can be removed only by patient and sustained efforts to develop and expand ':iudicial assistance" and other forms of

331

Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists

cooperation between the law enforcement and judicial systems of different
countries. The conventions create an obligation to cooperate in this regard, but,
as will be demonstrated in greater detail later, this obligation is often difficult for
countries with different types oflegal systems to meet, even assuming that they
act in complete good faith. The difficulty may be even greater when cybercrime
is involved.
Many, perhaps most, instances of computer network attack would not be
covered by the antiterrorist conventions. In such cases, the United States would
need to engage in a process ofrendition to get the suspect before a US court. Besides extradition, the forms of rendition include exclusion, deportation, and abduction. 44 Subject perhaps to very limited exceptions, abduction is illegal,45 and
exclusion and deportation involve unilateral action by the State of refuge and are
relatively informal measures subject to a relative lack oflegallimitations. Extradition is generally recognized as the only process of rendition that satisfactorily
protects the rights ofan accused. Assuming that the United States did not wish or
could not convince the State of refuge to deport the accused, it would try to extradite her. The obstacles to the success of this endeavor, however, could be
considerable.
Barriers to Extradition
First, the requested country would be under no obligation to extradite absent
an extradition treaty between it and the United States. 46 Although the United
States is a party to more than 100 bilateral extradition treaties and to the
Inter-American Convention on Extradition with 13 parties,47 the absence of an
extradition treaty has been a problem in some high profile cases. 48 Moreover, although the United States would be entitled to use most of the antiterrorist conventions for purposes of extradition, it has chosen not to do so.49 The United
States also will not itself extradite a person to a requesting country in the absence
of an extradition treaty.50
Even with an extradition treaty, the e:h.'tradition process is often fraught with
difficulties. As already noted, many, if not most, US extradition treaties require
that the action in question be a crime in both the requesting and requested
country for extradition to take place. This dual criminality requirement can
pose major problems in computer crime cases. Although the United States has
amended its criminal code to penalize a wide range of computer crimes, other
countries have been slow in doing the same. 51 This has resulted in cases where
the United States has identified the location of a perpetrator of a computer
crime, but has been unable to secure her extradition because the act in question was not a crime under the law of the country where the perpetrator was
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found and the extradition treaty between the United States and the country in
question contained a dual criminality requirement. 52 Although there is widespread recognition that countries need to reach a consensus as to which computer related activities should be criminalized, this is a process that will take
some time. 53
Under the e:Jo.."tradition law of a number of countries, it is necessary for a requesting country to present the requested country with satisfactory (to the requested country) evidence that a crime covered by the treaty has been
committed. 54 This has especially been the case with common law countries.
Great Britain, for example, traditionally required prima facie evidence ofa crime
covered by the extradition treaty. For countries on the continent of Europe,
which had no such requirement, this posed a "mystery" as to precisely how
much evidence was required to meet tIlls standard. 55 In 1982, approximately a
third ofthe applications made to the United Kingdom under its extradition treaties failed and the most common cause of failure was the requesting State's inability to satisfy the prima facie requirement. 56 Because ofthis record offailure in
the extradition process, Great Britain amended its extradition law in 1989 to exclude selectively the prima facie requirement in relation to certain States, and
then ratified the European Extradition Convention, which has no such requirement. 57 Instead, the convention requires only that the request be accompanied
by a certificate of conviction or the warrant for arrest, a statement of the offense
and a copy of the necessary laws. 58 The US test of "probable cause," which requires only that there be reasonable grounds to make it proper that an accused be
tried for the crime, has not proven to be a barrier to extradition. 59
The prima facie requirement has been defended on the ground that it oper-:
ates as a necessary protection for the individual who otherwise may be removed
to another State merely because he is suspected of having committed a crime
covered by the extradition treaty.60 Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the
prima facie requirement makes e:Jo.."tradition more difficult. This difficulty may be
especially great if computer network attacks are involved because the barriers to
gathering evidence in such cases, as already noted, may be substantial.
Another barrier to the extradition ofintemational terrorists may be the refusal
ofsome countries, especially those with a civil law background, to extradite their
nationals. 61 One of the grounds advanced by Libya in refusing to surrender two
Libyan members of the Libyan secret service who were indicted by a grand jury
of the District of Columbia in November 1991 for the December 1987 explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 persons, including 189 Americans, was that the Libyan Constitution prohibited the
extradition of Libyan nationals. 62
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The Austrian Supreme Court has gone so far to claim that the provision in
the Austrian Constitution prohibiting the extradition of nationals reflected "a
generally recognized rule ofinternationallaw."63 Even the government of the
United Kingdom reserves the right not to extradite nationals where there is no
extradition treaty with the requesting State and the latter is seeking the fugitive's
return under a multilateral, antiterrorist convention. 64
At least in Europe, however, the situation changed substantially in 1996,
when the European Union concluded a Convention Relating to Extradition of
Nationals. 65 The first paragraph ofArticle 7 ofthat convention provides that e}"1radition may not be refused on the ground that the "person claimed is a national of
the requested Member State." But the second and third paragraphs ofArticle 7 of
the convention permit a five year rolling reservation allowing member States to
refuse extradition of their nationals. According to Geoff Gilbert, the E},.'Planatory
Report "makes clear several matters:"
[F]irst, that the Nordic members of the European Union will no longer classify
domiciled aliens as nationals for the purposes ofintra-EU extradition; secondly,
that the protection of nationals might be achieved by those States which do not
ordinarily extradite nationals, by entering a reservation that any sentence imposed
by the requesting State will be served in the requested State; next, that given that
some States are constitutionally prohibited from extraditing their own nationals,
that they review the scope of the restriction at least once every five years; and,
finally, that reservations are not indefinite and can lapse. 66

In other words, even with the conclusion of the 1996 convention civil law
countries resist extraditing their own nationals.
On the other hand, as to certain international crimes, there is some evidence
that civil law States are beginning to relax their previous practice of never extraditing their nationals, at least in their extradition relations \vith common law
States. For example, the 1983 extradition treaty between the United States and
Italy specifically provides that extradition shall not be refused on grounds of nationality and is aimed at combatting the coordinated organized crime in the two
countries. 67 Further, the increasing practice of repatriating prisoners to serve
their sentences in their own country has reportedly convinced some civil law
countries in Europe to extradite their nationals to common law countries. 68
Outside of Europe there has also been some movement, albeit it slow and
tentative. In 1979 the United States and Colombia concluded an extradition
treaty that allowed for the surrender of nationals. 69 The treaty was a response to
the inability of the United States to secure the extradition of Colombian
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nationals who had imported illegal drugs, especially cocaine, into the United
States and who had so corrupted Colombian law enforcement officials that trial
in Colombia was not possible. The new extradition treaty was extremely unpopular in Colombia, however, and in 1988 the Colombia Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional.7° Repeated efforts by the United States
resulted in Colombia passing a new law allowing for the extradition of its nationals in 1997,71 and at this writing Colombia has extradited two drug suspects
to the United States.72
Relations between the United States and Mexico concerning the possible extradition of Mexican nationals have been especially tortuous.73 Under the·
US-Mexican E).."tradition Treaty,74 neither party is required to extradite its nationals. Rather, Article 9 of the treaty gives both parties the option to prosecute
as an alternative to e).."tradition, and from 1978 until 1996 Mexico, as a matter of
policy, refused to e).."tradite its citizens to the United States.75 Moreover, allegedly as a result of corruption among Mexican law enforcement officials, persons
that the United States sought to extradite, especially for drug trafficking, were
often not prosecuted in Mexico. Finally, in 1996, Mexico surrendered four ofits
citizens to the United States for prosecution, two of them for drug trafficking.76
Nonetheless, since that time, Mexico's record, from the US perspective, has been
unsatisfactory,77 and there have been recent court challenges to the extradition of
Mexican nationals that may have to be resolved by Mexico's highest court.78
Recognition by the requested country that the requesting country has jurisdiction to try the accused is a prerequisite to extradition. The complexity of civil
and criminal jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, however, is just beginning to be
recognized. 79
In recent years, at both the state and the federal level, the United States has
extended the death penalty to more and more crimes, including terrorist
. crimes. 80 By contrast, since World War II, opposition to the death penalty has
resulted in many countries including clauses in extradition treaties that exclude
extradition where the requesting State retains the death penalty and is unwilling
or unable to provide assurances that this penalty will not be carried out if the
accused is extradited. 81 This development has greatly complicated US extradition relations ,vith other countries, including cases involving terrorist crimes. 82
Another important development in recent years has been the increasing importance of human rights considerations as a limitation on extradition. 83 Opposition to the death penalty in the Western European States is based in large part
on the belief that it violates fundamental human rights values. On the other
hand, as noted byJohn Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, "[t]oday states
are irreconcilably divided over the morality and effectiveness of the death
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penalty, "84 and as a result its imposition is not prohibited by general international
law. Under certain circumstances, however, according to some authorities, imposition of the death penalty may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and thus violate general international law norms.
The best known of these authorities is the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom. 85 Soering, a West German national,
murdered his girlfriend's parents in Virginia and fled to the United Kingdom. In
response to a US request, the United Kingdom ordered his extradition to the
United States. Soering, however, petitioned the European Commission ofHuman Rights, which referred his case to the European Court of Human Rights.
The court held that the United Kingdom had an obligation under Article 3 of
the European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, not to extradite Soering to the
United States where there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period in the
state of Virginia. Eventually Soering was extradited to the United States when
the United Kingdom received assurances from US officials that he would not be
subjected to the death penalty.86
Although it is not a judicial body with authority to hand down a decision
binding on parties to a dispute, the Human Rights Committee, which is the
body established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights87
to supervise implementation of the covenant by States parties, found in Ng v.
Canada88 that California's practice of executing by gas asphyxiation, which
might take over ten minutes to cause death, resulted in prolonged suffering constituting cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7 of the
covenant. On the basis of this finding, the committee was of the opinion that
Canada, which could reasonably have foreseen that Ng would be executed in
this way, had violated its obligations under the covenant by e:ll.."traditing him to
the United States.
In 1980 Alona Evans identified the political offense exception, which is
grounded, at least in part, in human rights considerations,89 as the "hot issue" of
extradition law. 9o At that time, the political exception was regarded as perhaps
the primary barrier to the extradition of international terrorists. 91 But in recent
years States have taken a variety of steps to limit or even to eliminate the political
offense exception as a defense to extradition,92 and it is unclear whether the political offense exception remains a major barrier to e:ll..1:radition at the present time. 93
As an alternative to or a substitute for the political offense exception, extradition treaties may permit the accused to claim that he will not receive a fair trial in
the requesting country. Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom
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Supplementary Extradition Treaty of 1985,94 for example, expressly permits a
judicial inquiry into whether the extraditee will be "prejudiced at his trial or
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions." This so-called "humanitarian exception"
was inserted because of the concern of some US Senators that the elimination of
the political offense exception effected by the supplementary extradition treaty
would result in inadequate protection for extraditees. By giving the courts the
responsibility of ruling on allegations of an unfair trial, the treaty waters down
the rule of noninquiry US courts normally apply, under which the courts defer
to the executive branch to make the decision as to the validity of such allegations. 95 In practice, however, courts in the United States have been extremely
reluctant to make a finding that would reflect on the standards ofjustice in the
United Kingdom. 96 On the other hand, courts in both the United States and
Canada have held that the rule of noninquiry is not absolute and that it will not
be followed if the likely treatment in the requesting State would be shocking or
simply unacceptable.97
As a result ofthese many barriers, the extradition process has been described as
"a creaking steam engine of an affair."9B Former US Attorney General Benjamin
R. Civiletti was of the view that extradition laws belong to "the world of the
horse and buggy and the steamship, not in the world of commercialjet air transportation and high speed telecommunications."99 It is therefore not surprising
that law enforcement officials have often turned to alternative forms of rendition
in their efforts to bring alleged offenders to a forum for prosecution.

Alternatives to Extradition
One alternative to extradition that has been employed with some frequency
in Europe is "hot pursuit."100 This approach allows the police authorities of one
State to cross the borders of a neighboring State in hot pursuit of a fleeing fugitive, and it is consistent with the policy of internal open borders that the European Union has followed since 1993. Also, the Schengen Accord of 1990,101
concluded among Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, allows the police agencies of the States parties to
cross borders in hot pursuit, although the precise scope of this authority is a matter of dispute. 102 Outside ofEurope, the doctrine of hot pursuit is apparently not
\videly utilized as a method of rendition. 103
The methods of rendition most often utilized as alternatives to extradition are
exclusion and deportation. 104 Exclusion may occur when fugitives are apprehended as they attempt to enter a country, and deportation may be an option
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when fugitives are arrested within a country's territory. In US practice, not surprisingly, many of these exclusions and deportations have involved Canada and
Mexico and have been directed towards persons accused of drug trafficking. lOS
Both exclusion and deportation are civil processes, designed for immigration control and dominated by the executive. As a consequence, exclusion and deportation
proceedings utilized for rendition purposes do not apply criminal justice standards,
either with respect to the interests of the States involved or to protection of the accused. Unlike e>..1:radition, exclusion and deportation rarely involve a fonnal request by a State seeking a return of the alleged offender. On the contrary,
exclusion and deportation are effected at the instance of a territorial State. 106
Perhaps the most controversial use of deportation as an alternative to e>..1:radition was the case of Joseph Doherty. After unsuccessful attempts to extradite
Doherty, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, from the United
States to the United Kingdom, where he was wanted for his role in the death ofa
British soldier and for his escape from prison, because of decisions by US courts
that his offenses fell within the political offense exception in the US-UK extradition treaty,107 the United States Supreme Court upheld his deportation to
Northern Ireland after long and complicated legal proceedings. lOS Apparently,
the deportation ofDoherty was handled as a purely internal matter and not in response to a request from the United Kingdom that he be deported. Although
some commentators have argued that it is improper for one State to request another to deport an individual as a means of circumventing extradition procedures, US courts have repeatedly held that the existence of an extradition treaty
between the United States and another country does not bar the use of other
means to obtain custody over a criminal located abroad. 109 In contrast, complicity between the French government and another government to use deportation
as an alternative to extradition may reportedly be the basis for dismissal of the
.
prosecution. 110
The most controversial alternative to extradition has, of course, been abduction or kidnaping of alleged offenders. Both commentators and State practice
support the general proposition that international law prohibits a State from
sending its agents into another State to abduct an individual residing there \vithout that other State's permission. 111 Abductions would seem prima facie to violate a principal rule of international law, which states that a nation is absolutely
sovereign within the boundaries of its own territory.
There is at least an argument, however, that abduction may be consistent with
international law u~der certain extraordinary circumstances. Despite the prohibition against the use of unilateral force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Article 51 allows a victim of an armed attack to use force to defend itself pending
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action by the Security Council. 112 Justification of a government sponsored abduction ofa fugitive necessarily requires characterizing the actions of the fugitive
as an "anned attack" within the meaning of Article 51. 113 This characterization
has most often been applied to cases of terrorism and drug trafficking. In 1989,
eX'Pressly repudiating an earlier opinion to the contrary in 1980,114 then Assistant
Attorney General William Barr produced a legal opinion that international law
allowed US law enforcement officials to make extraterritorial arrests under certain circumstances. 11S Testifying before Congress, Barr stated on behalf of the
Department ofJustice:
[T]here are instances where extraterritorial arrest without the host sovereign's
consent may be justified under intemationallaw. For example, in response to an
actual or threatened terrorist attack, we would have good grounds under general
principles ofinternationallaw to justify extraterritorial law enforcement actions
over a foreign sovereign's objections. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances we
may have a sound basis under international law to take action against large-scale
drug traffickers being given safe haven by a government acting in complicity with
their criminal enterprise. Thus, it may well be that the President will choose to
direct extraterritorial arrests only when he believes that he is justified in doing so
as a matter of self-defense under international law. 116

The validity ofMr. Barr's proposition has been subject to sharp debate. 117 In
practice, however, at least as of this writing, the US Government has made no
extraterritorial arrests of alleged terrorists without the consent of the territorial
sovereign. The 1987 sting operation that resulted in the apprehension of Fawas
Y ounis took place on a US ship in the Mediterranean after Y ounis had been
lured there by US agents. 118
In contrast, the US Government has made extraterritorial arrests in drug trafficking cases. 119 The most controversial of these Was the 1990 apprehension and
deportation to the United States of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain by Mexican agents paid by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Dr. AlvarezMachain was a prominent Mexican gynecologist who had been indicted for the
kidnap and murder ofEnrique Camarena, a DEA agent stationed in Guadalajara.
Mter strong protests by the Mexican Government, and a circuit court opinion
holding that the abduction violated the US-Mexico extradition treaty,120 the
US Supreme Court ruled that the abduction was not barred by the extradition
treaty and that US courts could exercise jurisdiction over the case. 121 Although
the majority opinion all but conceded by way of dicta that the abduction violated norms ofcustomary international law, 122 the court did not address the issue
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of whether this might constitute a basis for US courts to decline jurisdiction.
Courts in several other countries have ruled that they have discretion in such circumstances to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. 123
The Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain has been subjected to
sharp criticism. 124 Be that as it may, Geoff Gilbert has suggested that, paradoxically, the Court's decision may "hasten the demise of State sponsored kidnaps of
alleged international criminals, for it has brought to the fore this attempt to authorize the 'manifesdy illegal."'125 Indeed, in the wake of Alvarez-Machain, the
Bush Administration quickly responded with assurances that it had no intention
of either increasing or institutionalizing the practice of e:l\."traterritorial abductions. 126 Also, in 1994, the United States and Mexico concluded a Treaty to
Prohibit Transborder Abductions 127 (which, however, as of this writing has not
yet been sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification).

Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Regardless of what method of rendition is used, once an accused is before a
US court, it is necessary to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But if the
evidence to do this is located abroad, and cannot be obtained, the successful rendition of the accused may be a pyrrhic victory.
Moreover, the legal mechanisms for obtaining evidence abroad for use in
criminal proceedings are less than satisfactory.128 Letters rogatory, the standard
mechanism, are especially ill-suited for obtaining evidence regarding computer
crimes. Letters rogatory require an application to a foreign court and usually provide for advance notice and participation by opposing parties. Hence, the procedure is relatively public, as compared to the US practice of conducting criminal
investigations under the veil of grand jury secrecy. It is, moreover, even under
the best of circumstances extremely slow, and foreign tribunals may give limited
or no assistance at the pre-indictment phase of a case. In any event, the decision
offoreign tribunals to respond favorably is purely discretionary, since the letters
rogatory practice is based on comity considerations rather than on binding international legal norms.
Because they create binding international legal obligations for the States parties, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) may be of greater value. As of
November 15, 1997, the United States had 23 MLATs in force. 129 They provide
prosecutors with a channel for sending requests for assistance in obtaining evidence through a Central Authority in one country130 to a corresponding prosecutorial authority in the other country, which oversees the prompt execution of
the request. Under MLATs, foreign prosecutorial authorities will normally seek
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mandatory process under their law, when necessary, to execute the request and
keep it confidential to the extent possible.
The US MLATs contain a provision that obligates a requested country to
conduct searches and seizures on behalf of a requesting country if the request includes infonnation justifying such action under the laws of the requested country. Only a few of these MLATs, however, apply broadly to all law enforcement
investigations and prosecutions, rather than only to certain types of offenses such
as drug trafficking and money laundering. Additionally, the political offense exception is often available in MLATs and can be a barrier to obtaining the necessary evidence. Finally, even though the MLAT process is usually much faster
than letters rogatory, as we have seen, evidence ofcomputer crime can be rapidly
transferred out of the jurisdiction of the requested country to other countries
\vith whom the United States has no MLAT.
Especially for the collection of electronic evidence, MLATs, while an improvement on letters rogatory, are unequal to the task. The problem has been
aptly posed by Michael Sussmann: "How does law enforcement collect electronic evidence that may be scattered acroSs several different countries, can be
deleted or altered \vith one click of a mouse, may be encrypted, and will ultimately need to be authenticated in another country's court?"131 The ability to
delete or alter electronic evidence with the click ofa mouse renders even the relatively rapid procedures available under MLATs hopelessly slow and cumbersome. Accordingly, in Sussmann's view:
[W]hen electronic evidence is sought, there may be a need for mechanisms such
as a "preservation of evidence request" or "protected seizure," which would
work as follows. Where there is a particularized concern about the loss of
electronic evidence, a country would make an informal international request that
the data immediately be preserved. This could be accomplished in a number of
ways, from having a telecommunications carrier or ISP [Internet Service
Provider] copy and store a customer's data, to actually seizing a criminal's
computer and securing, but not searching, it for a short period of time. Once data
is (sic) protected from loss, eA-pedited processes would provide the foreign
country \vith formal documentation to authorize the issuance of a domestic
search warrant or similar process. 132

As Sussmann notes, the US Code provides for a fonn of "preservation of evidence" request. 133 Most other countries apparently do not have such provisions
in their laws, although the need for them has recently been recognized, at least in
principle. Once such provisions are in place, it may be necessary to revise the
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MLATs to ensure that the law enforcement officials of the other party to the
treaty will be able to take advantage of them.
Transborder searches and seizures are an especially difficult problem when
electronic evidence is involved. Although paper documents are normally located in the same country as the person being investigated, this is not necessarily
the case with electronic evidence. To the contrary, electronic data may be stored
in another country or countries to keep them beyond the reach of law
enforcement.
Transborder searches consist of a law enforcement officer in his or her own
country accessing a computer in another country to obtain electronic evidence. 134 Such searches may take place unknowingly. For example, if an investigator searches the computer of a domestic corporation, the data accessed
through that search may be located in another country unbeknovmst to the investigator. Unconsented to transborder searches of electronic evidence may be
viewed by the country where the search occurs as a violation of its sovereignty
or even of its criminal law, subjecting the individual investigator to possible
criminal liability. From a law enforcement perspective, it is necessary for countries to agree on principles permitting transborder searches under clearly defined but broad circumstances. 135 Others may be of the view that the need to
protect data in a particular country outweighs law enforcement concerns. Although this issue is currendy being debated in several international forums, its
outcome is far from certain. 136
If an investigator succeeds in accessing electronic evidence, wherever it may
be located, the evidence may be unintelligible because it is encrypted, i.e.,
scrambled to protect its confidentiality. The need for encryption is ,videly recognized as necessary to protect the confidentiality of e-mail traffic, stored data,
and commercial transactions. However, when criminals use encryption for
communications or data storage, they may severely hamper criminal investigations by preventing timely access to the content of seized or intercepted data.
Hence, law enforcement officials are concerned that they be able to obtain the
"keys" to decrypt encrypted data. 137 In contrast, privacy advocates, cyber-rights
groups, and defense counsel, among others, oppose granting law enforcement
broad authority in this area.
Moreover, according to Phillip Reitinger, the principal legal obstacle to
law enforcement access to "plaintext" (i.e., unencrypted or decrypted text)
and keys is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 138
Reitinger concludes that a grand jury subpoena can order the production of
the plaintext of encrypted documents and the production of documents that
reveal keys. He further concludes, however, that whether law enforcement
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can compel production of keys that are only known, rather than recorded, is
an open question. 139
At this writing, Congress has passed, and the President has signed, the
"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of2001."140
This highly controversial legislation, which critics have argued could be used
overzealously and harm innocent people,141 provides, for the first time, for federal monitoring of computer communications, allowing investigators to track
the sending and receiving of e-mail and Internet connections. They will not,
however, be able to read the content of such computer communications without first obtaining a warrant. The legislation will also, among other things, allow
investigators to conduct unannounced searches of property owned or occupied
by terrorism suspects and to share information from federal criminal investigations \vith intelligence agencies for the first time.
There is also controversy over the efforts oflaw enforcement officials to secure laws that would permit them to sidestep encryption. 142 Regardless of how
this debate is resolved, there is a need to reach agreement at the international
level on decryption support services. As Michael Sussmann has pointed out,
only the more modem of US MLATs contain provisions that are flexible
enough to accommodate such newer forms of assistance as decryption services. 143 Even these MLATs do not specifically address the subject of decryption, and there currendy are no international commitments to provide decryption support. Although there are discussions and negotiations underway in
various international forums designed to resolve the problems of access to
computers by law enforcement persons and encryption along with related is:'"
sues, the final outcome of these efforts is uncertain at this writing.144

Some Concluding Observations
From the foregoing discussion, one may safely conclude that the prospect of
computer network attacks by terrorists has only recendy begun to receive the attention-from statesmen, law enforcement officials, and scholars-that it deserves. Moreover, although international terrorism has long been a subject of
intense scrutiny, the prospect of computer network attacks by terrorists introduces legal and operational complications for those engaged in efforts to prevent,
contain, and punish terrorist attacks.
Law and the legal process has traditionally lagged technological developments and the computer revolution is no exception. In particular, the speed
\vith which computers operate and the anonymity of their operators create
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challenges for the "snail pace" of traditional law enforcement methods. Also, as
we have seen, at the domestic level in the United States there is currently a significant tension between the perceived needs oflaw enforcement and protection of the privacy rights of US citizens. At the international level this tension
is likely to be as intense, perhaps even more, than it is in the United States,
since the Europeans, for example, strongly emphasize the protection of privacy
in their law and practice. 145
Although there are strenuous efforts in various international fora to resolve
these problems, including the adoption ofa draft convention on computer crime
under the auspices of the Council ofEurope, the success of these endeavors is by
no means assured. Nonetheless, it has long been a truism that international cooperation is crucial to successful efforts to combat international terrorism. 146 This
truism applies a fortiori to efforts to combat computer network attacks by
terrorists.
Moreover, international cooperation in combating terrorism has often taken
the form of informal arrangements and liaisons between law enforcement officials in several countries, rather than the use of formal arrangements spelled out
in treaties or national legislation. In view of the speed with which law enforcement personnel need to act to cope with a computer network attack, informality is likely to be required to give law enforcement the flexibility it needs to
operate successfully. At the same time, the need for appropriate restraints on law
enforcement of the kind provided by legal regulation is also great in the field of
computer crime. The struggle to find the right balance is likely to continue for
some time to come.
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